Supreme Court Underscores Right To Maintenance For 'All' Muslim Women
By Gajanan Khergamker
In a landmark decision delivered on 9 July 2024, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the applicability of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to Muslim women, a move that underscores the secular essence of Indian jurisprudence.
The bench comprising Justices BV Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih dismissed a petition filed by a Muslim man challenging the directive to pay interim maintenance to his divorced wife under Section 125 CrPC.
Justice Nagarathna, in her detailed judgment, unequivocally stated, "We are dismissing the criminal appeal with the conclusion that Section 125 CrPC would be applicable to all women and not just married women." This pronouncement extends the protective shield of Section 125, which ensures maintenance rights to all women irrespective of their marital status, thereby reinforcing the inclusive nature of Indian law.
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| The Supreme Court of India |
In a concurrence that mirrors the judicial prudence synonymous with the Supreme Court, Justice Masih reiterated that the secular law encapsulated in Section 125 CrPC takes precedence over personal laws when it comes to the maintenance of women.
This judgment fortifies the notion that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, does not override the CrPC, thus ensuring that the maintenance rights of divorced Muslim women remain intact under the broader, secular framework of the Indian legal system.
Furthermore, the bench elucidated that during the pendency of a petition under Section 125 CrPC, if a Muslim woman is divorced, she retains the right to seek redress under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. This provision is not to be viewed as a substitution but rather as an additional remedy, reinforcing the dual avenues available for seeking justice.
This ruling, encapsulating separate but concurring judgments from Justices Nagarathna and Masih, underscores the Supreme Court's commitment to upholding the rights of women across all strata, transcending religious boundaries.
It is a testament to the evolving landscape of Indian law, one that steadfastly moves towards a more equitable and just society.
In the course of the hearing, the Bench observed that Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act begins with a non-obstante clause. As such, it is not in derogation to what is already provided under Section 125 CrPC, but an additional remedy.
Justice Augustine George Masih clarified "this Act does not bar...it is the choice of the person who had applied or moved an application under 125...there is no statutory provision provided under the Act of 1986 which says that 125 is not maintainable." Justice BV Nagarathna echoed this sentiment, noting that the 1986 law did not preclude one legal remedy in favor of another.
When the Bench inquired whether the petitioner had provided for his respondent-wife during the iddat period, the answer was negative. The Amicus Curiae, however, pointed out that a draft of Rs. 15,000 was offered by the petitioner during the iddat period, although it remained unclaimed by the respondent-wife. The Bench noted that had the petitioner made provisions during the iddat period, Section 127(3)(b) CrPC might have been applicable.
Addressing the petitioner's assertion that none of the cited judgments had dealt with Section 7 of the Act, Justice Nagarathna remarked that the provision pertained only to pending cases and was thus transitional. The Amicus countered by highlighting a Kerala High Court judgment, which held that Section 7 could not be interpreted as extinguishing the right of divorced Muslim women to file petitions under Section 125 CrPC. The Kerala High Court had ruled that the transitional provision was designed to avoid requiring Muslim women, with pending Section 125 CrPC petitions, to file new claims under Section 3 of the Act.
The Bench emphasised, "If the Parliament had the intention to extinguish such rights of the Muslim woman, it would only be reasonable to expect the Parliament to speak in definite and specific language about such extinguishment. Parliament must have been aware that when 1986 Act was enacted, number of orders must have passed in favour of divorced Muslim women under Section 125...Message appears to us to be loud and clear...Both rights, under Section 125 of the Code and Section 3 were conferred on the divorced women. She has the right to choose."
Refuting the petitioner’s claim that the Act's provisions indicated Parliament’s intent to bar Muslim women from filing maintenance claims under Section 125 CrPC, the Court opined that such an interpretation would be unconstitutional. The Bench noted that if Parliament intended to preclude divorced Muslim women from filing petitions under Section 125 CrPC post the Act's commencement, it would have explicitly provided for an overriding effect. Justice Nagarathna poignantly stated, "In the absence of such a thing, can we add a restriction to the Act? That is the point."
This analysis, deeply rooted in judicial prudence, underscores the Court's steadfast commitment to ensuring that divorced Muslim women retain the right to seek maintenance under the secular and inclusive provisions of Section 125 CrPC, reinforcing the egalitarian principles that underpin Indian law.
